We present a stress testing approach based on a dynamic model of default. Retail credit models are implemented using discrete survival analysis which enables macroeconomic conditions to be included directly as time-varying covariates. In consequence, these models can be used for stress testing by determining changes in default given downturn economic scenarios. In particular Monte Carlo simulation is used to generate a distribution of estimated default rates from which extreme Value at Risk and expected shortfall are computed. Several macroeconomic variables are considered and factor analysis is employed to model the structure between these variables. Two large UK data sets are used to test this approach, resulting in plausible dynamic models and stress test outcomes.
Introduction
Stress tests have become increasingly important in evaluating the riskiness of bank loan portfolios and they are recognised as a key tool in helping financial institutions make business strategy, risk management and capital planning decisions (FSA 2008) .
They allow us to ask what level of losses we can expect given worst case scenarios when taking a number of risk factors into account. Stress tests should take into consideration unexpected but also plausible events from which unexpected losses can be computed. In turn regulatory and economic capital can be computed as required by the Basel II Accord (BCBS 2005) . Most models of default for retail credit are either point in time (PIT) or through the cycle (TTC), neither of which are able to give good estimates of default rate on a portfolio through the business cycle since in the first case, PIT will reflect the conditions of a particular point in the business cycle and in the second case, TTC models will reflect average conditions. Unlike previous literature we consider a form of dynamic model of consumer default that includes time varying macroeconomic conditions and we use it to consider losses during downturn periods and as the basis of a principled approach to stress testing a portfolio. We present such a stress test of a portfolio. Bellotti and Crook (2009) use a Cox Proportional Hazards survival model of time to default. This model has the advantage that macroeconomic time series data can be included in a principled way into the model as time varying covariates. They show that the inclusion of macroeconomic variables such as bank interest rates and earnings was significant and had the expected effect: that is, an increase in interest rates tends to raise risk of default whilst a rise in earnings tends to lower risk of default. We develop this method by building discrete time survival models of default with Retail credit stress testing using a dynamic model with macroeconomic factors Bellotti and Crook 3 of 33 macroeconomic conditions on two different large credit card data sets. The advantages of this approach are that (1) the model reflects the discrete nature of accounts data, in our case it is monthly, (2) the model build is quicker and (3) the procedure for forecasting using this model is less complex. Discrete time survival models have been used to model corporate bankruptcy without macroeconomic variables (Shumway 2001 , Cheng et al 2009 , and personal bankruptcy (Gross and Souleles 2002) and mortgage foreclosures (Gerardi et al 2008) with macroeconomic variables, but none of these papers show how the models can be used for stress testing. Breedon and Thomas (2008) use a dynamic model to stress test over several scenarios from past economic crises. They identify a number of important macroeconomic indicators of default such as interest rate and GDP but do not build distributions of estimated default rates.
The use of scenario-based stress tests is now common in the regulation of banks (Hoggarth and Whitley 2003 , FSA 2008 , FRS 2009 ). This approach is based on selecting hypothetical economic scenarios using judgements supported by prior economic knowledge and considering plausible developments of the economy.
However, this approach is problematic since it allows a high degree of subjective judgement in the selection process. For example, recent stress tests of major US banks (FRS 2009 ) have been criticized since the "more adverse" conditions it uses are considered too weak. For example, the estimate for adverse 2009 unemployment rate was already exceeded within the year. Baker (2009) estimates that the US stress test could have under-estimated losses by $120 billion. Clearly, the recent financial crisis has shown that past stress tests failed, since banks and regulators were left surprised by levels of losses. Haldane (2009) gives several reasons for this failure. One is that Retail credit stress testing using a dynamic model with macroeconomic factors Bellotti and Crook 4 of 33 the banking system has not taken all risk factors into account or has under-estimated their effect (disaster myopia). A second is that banks never had internal incentives to conduct stress tests seriously (misaligned incentives). It is clear that further rigour is required in the stress testing process.
In this paper we consider Monte Carlo simulation for stress testing of consumer credit portfolios as an alternative to a scenario-based approach. This is a statistical and computational method which is less subjective than scenario selection, since scenarios are automatically simulated based on historical distributions of risk factors. There remains a subjective judgement in the selection of risk factors themselves. Monte Carlo simulation is a standard approach for stress testing of corporate credit (Marrison 2002 ), although we have seen no published account of its use for retail credit. Monte Carlo simulation generates a distribution of estimated loss. It is common to use Value at Risk (VaR) to compute extreme loss based on this distribution. However, there is a distinction between VaR and the requirements of stress testing since VaR captures worst case in normal circumstances, whereas stress testing attempts to capture losses given unusual circumstances. There is a connection between the two, but a noticeable difference in value can emerge when considering non-linear exposures or fat-tail loss distributions (BIS 2005) . For this reason we also report expected shortfall for worst case scenarios. To generate economic simulations, it is necessary to model the structure of the macroeconomic data. We use principal component analysis (PCA) to derive key macroeconomic factors (MF) which are used in the default model. Factor analysis has been used successfully to model macroeconomic conditions; for example, the Chicago Fed National Activity Index is a highly regarded and reliable factor representing the US economy (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 2001).
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Dynamic models of default including macroeconomic conditions are built for two large UK portfolios of credit cards and used to conduct plausible stress tests using a simulation approach. In section 2 we describe our modelling and stress testing methods, in section 3 we describe our data and give results and in section 4 we discuss our conclusions.
Method
We employ a discrete time logit survival model to estimate a dynamic model of default. We then use Monte Carlo simulation to generate distributions of estimated default rate across an aggregate of accounts. We discuss each of these techniques in the following subsections.
Dynamic model of default
We consider a panel data set of credit card accounts. 
which, assuming independence between default events implies that the expected default rate is ( )
This is our usual point prediction of default rate. However, for stress testing we are interested in a distribution of estimated default rate given changes in the economy, so we consider the cumulative probability distribution over default rates given by
for some density function p across economic conditions z. Distribution (4) can be used to compute extreme estimates of default rate. In particular, Value at Risk (VaR) for percentile q is given by the smallest value q V such that ( ) 100
Then expected shortfall is computed as the mean value for the worst case scenarios in the distribution above percentile q:
In addition to macroeconomic risk factors, we also need to consider noise in the data, relative to the model, as a risk factor in estimating default rates, since this will effect the distribution of outcomes. These are introduced by considering the model as a latent model with a residual term it ε independent of all covariates and independently distributed in F:
where ( ) ⋅ I is the indicator function (see Verbeek 2004, section 7.1.3) . Then substituting (6) into (2) we have default rate in terms of the model, macroeconomic conditions z and a vector of N residual terms
is the probability given that each residual is drawn independently from F.
Substituting into (4) and assuming independence between z and ε gives
Monte Carlo simulation
Monte Carlo simulation is a means to compute integrals across distributions of values.
In general, if
, where χ is uni-or multi-dimensional, then given large m,
is a good approximation, and converges in the limit, to
, where each j x is a random draw (simulation) from the density function f (Robert and Casella 1999) . Suppose, then, that for j=1 to m, j z′ and j ε′ are randomly generated from distributions for ( )
respectively and indexed such that simulated default rates are in ascending order: that is, for all
. Then, by Monte Carlo simulation, (8) is approximated as
The number of iterations m is chosen such that (9) converges to a stable value which is data dependent. Since the definition of c D′ (7) involves an indicator function over a threshold term for default, this simulation can be interpreted as simulating default or non-default events for each account in the data set, depending on the risk factors. In this sense it can be viewed as following the final simulation step used by Jokivuolle et al (2008) in their work on stress testing capital requirements for corporate data. From the definition of VaR and the ordering of simulated default rates it follows that
Similarly (5) gives
which is expressed as the Monte Carlo simulation
It is easy to generate the residual terms by repeatedly sampling from F, which here is the standard logit distribution. However, the distribution over macroeconomic
requires that the structure amongst the macroeconomic variables is modelled. This can be done using Cholesky decomposition which preserves the covariance structure between simulated variables (Marrison 2002) . However an alternative is to apply principal component analysis (PCA) to the macroeconomic series prior to including them in the model. PCA is a well-known technique which generates a series of components that are a linear combination of a set of random variables such that the first component accounts for as much of the variability in the data as possible, the second component is orthogonal to the first whilst accounting for as much of the remainder of the variance, and so on. The problem is well-posed and is solved by finding eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the matrix of data. For factor analysis, it is conventional to retain all components with eigenvalues greater than 1.
For details, see Joliffe (2002) . Hence, instead of including raw macroeconomic time series, we use macroeconomic factors (MF) instead. This is suitable since the factors will not be correlated with one another, therefore they can be generated independently in the simulation process. The macroeconomic values are drawn from the historical distribution of the factors. These are not necessarily normal, so we use the Box-Cox transformation to model each factor distribution and convert to normal. Box and Cox (1964) show how to transform a given random variable x with the goal of producing an approximately normal distribution. They use the general form
where k is a fixed parameter to allow for negative values of x and λ is a parameter estimated by maximizing the likelihood of the transformed values, assuming they are generated from a normal distribution. VaR on average and the distribution of such cases is governed by the binomial distribution which allows us to test the significance of outcomes (Marrison 2002, chapter 8) . The application of the binomial test to this problem is well-known and forms the basis of the traffic-light validation system used by industry and regulators (Blochwitz and Hohl 2007) . A potential difficulty with this approach is that the binomial test assumes independence between observations and this may not be the case for default rates on a portfolio over time. Therefore, this assumption should be tested prior to using the binomial test. Autoregression can be used to test dependency over the time series.
Validation of stress tests

Experimental Results
Data
We have two large data sets for two UK credit card products, consisting of over A validation set consisting of one year of data is produced by randomly dividing each product data set into a training and validation data set in a 2:1 ratio of accounts, then discarding all records after an observation date of June 2005 from the training data set 2 For reasons of commercial confidentiality, we cannot reveal descriptive statistics or default rates for these data.
and keeping only accounts opened prior to the observation date, but considering only records after the observation date, for the test set. This procedure ensures (1) there is no selection bias, since accounts in the validation data set are selected randomly and independently, (2) the validation data set is both out-of-sample and post-training data and (3) the validation is realistic in the sense that only accounts that are known (ie already open) prior to the observation date are included in the validation set.
Breedon and Thomas (2008) use several macroeconomic variables in their models of default such as GDP, interest rate, unemployment rate, house price and consumption variables, such as retail sales, which they argue could impact consumer delinquency.
Bellotti and Crook (2009) also find bank interest rates, earnings, production and house prices significant in explaining default for different credit card data. We therefore follow with a similar set of variables described in Table 1 . Notice that production index is used instead of GDP since production index is available monthly in the UK whereas GDP is quarterly. The difference in the value over 12 months is used for all variables to avoid inadvertently including a time trend or seasonal variation in the time series. The log value of FTSE, house prices and earnings are used in the model since these follow an obvious exponential trend. Since both the behavioural and macroeconomic data is monthly we use discrete monthly time in the survival model. prior expectation of sign of effect on the probability of default and these are shown in Table 2 . In particular, we expect greater values of interest rates, unemployment rate and RPI to represent increased stress on retail obligors, whereas greater values for production, earnings and house price should indicate improved economic conditions and hence a reduction of likelihood to default. The expected effect of each MF on the probability of default is then also given, based on the sign of the loading of the variable within the factor. We observe that only MF2 is expected to have an overall positive effect on default since all variables with a prior expectation are expected to have a positive effect in MF2 except for earnings. For other variables, we can hypothesize economic effects on the likelihood to default having either sign and we are unable to judge a priori which effect would be stronger. So increases in equity prices (FTSE) are indicators of economic health which we expect to reduce default rates; however, they are also linked to greater consumer activity which implies greater use of consumer credit and possible indebtedness. Similarly, the effect of consumption variables, retail sales and consumer confidence, are less easy to predict.
Factor analysis
It is possible that increases in these variables imply a greater load on credit card accounts as a consequence of higher sales. However, an opposite effect is possible since they also indicate improved economic confidence among consumers. For this reason, we do not state a prior overall expected effect for these factors.
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The movement of MFs is shown in Figure 1 , extrapolating into the period of the financial crisis of 2008. The previous major recession in the UK began with the stock market crash in October 1987. All MFs show a large movement following this date.
In particular, MF3 shows a sharp decline at this time and this is unsurprising given that the main contributor to MF3 is the FTSE index. However MF2 has the most sustained upward trend for several years after the beginning of the crisis, indicating strain on consumption after the stock market crash. Extrapolating into 2008, we see the dramatic effect of the financial crisis during this period on all MFs. This is evidence that these factors are good indicators of economic stress and could be used for stress testing. 
Model fit
Along with MFs, the models also include application and behavioural variables and annual indicator variables for vintage, but these will not be reported in our results since the main focus of this paper is the inclusion of macroeconomic conditions and stress testing. For further details about building and assessment of a survival model using application and macroeconomic variables for retail credit cards, see Bellotti and Crook (2009) . Models were built with behavioural variables lagged by 12 months in order to reduce the possible effect of endogeneity between behavioural data and default event (eg a rise in account balance and default may have a common external cause) and to allow for forecasts up to 12 months ahead. MFs were included with lag 3 months since we anticipate that economic conditions contribute to default at the time when payments first begin to be missed. It is possible that earlier lags could be used but our preliminary experiments indicated that a 3 month lag is sufficient. For the Selected MF model, a significance level of 1% was chosen for stepwise variable selection. This was sufficient for selection of factors whilst ensuring highly correlated factors are not included together. Table 3 shows MF coefficient estimates for models built on training data for each product. Several factors are statistically significant in the models. In particular, MF2
is a strong driver in all models and has the direction of effect as expected overall, as shown in Table 2 . Figure 2 showed that MF2 was the strongest signal of the effect of the October 1987 stock market crash, hence its inclusion in the models is promising for stress testing. MF3 is also a driver for product B although the size of effect is not as large as MF2. There was no overall expected direction of effect for MF3: as shown in Table 2 , three loaded variables have a positive expected effect and three with a negative expected effect. However FTSE is the largest contributor to MF3 which implies that the strongest effect of FTSE on likelihood to default is not as an indicator of economic health but as an indirect indicator of consumer spending and possible over-indebtedness. and MF3 so the model for product B which includes both these factors is not affected by multicollinearity. product and for stress tests using different risk factors. We found these distributions converged after 50,000 simulations. For reasons of commercial confidentiality we cannot report the precise default rates. Instead we report estimated default rate as a ratio of the median estimated default rate computed using the Selected MF model. Selected MF model has a long tail, as shown in Figure 5 . The long tail is typical of loss distributions and we would expect to observe it (BIS 2005). In the case of these experiments, the long tail is a consequence of including MF2 in the stress test which itself has a long tail (see Figure 2 ). Comparing the All MF to the Selected MF models, we find that for both products, the distributions based on the All MF models are much broader, leading to relatively extreme VaR and unexpected shortfall. This is a consequence of the inflated coefficient estimates caused by multicollinearity between MFs, rather than a genuine warning of greater risk. Finally, we note that excluding estimation uncertainty as a risk factor makes very little difference to the distribution, even at extremes, and so for practical purposes it can be safely excluded.
Stress test results
Models
Validation is performed using a binomial test on the post, out-of-sample validation data consisting of 12 months of data. Figures 6a to 6d show time series plots of observed default rates, along with percentiles for the simulated distributions for each month. The binomial test is based on the number of observations that are above the 99 th or 99.9 th VaR. Figures 6a and 6c show that for both products, the Selected MF model gives plausible distributions and the binomial test gives probability of outcome greater than 10%. However, the No MF model gives implausible outcome with probability of outcomes above VaR being less than 1%, based on Figures 6b and 6d .
The binomial test assumes independence between observations. We tested this assumption for our data using autoregression (AR(1) and AR (2)) and found no significant correlation for default rates over time . in write-offs) and this is the case for both products that we used. Hence, in reality, hitting 99% VaR is reasonable given the increased risks on many credit card portfolios during this period, relative to previous periods.
The results suggest that the Selected MF model gives the most plausible stress test outcomes. From Table 5 we see that this stress test yields a stressed value of monthly default rate about double the median. A doubling of default rates is a large increase but not implausible given an economic crisis. Indeed, based on data given by the Bank of England (2008, Chart 2.7), average write-off rates for credit cards in the UK, generally, were 2.5% during the relatively benign period of our training data, but rose to 7% during the recent financial crisis by 2007: a multiple of 2.8. Further, in our experiments we find expected shortfall is 15-20% greater than VaR. As argued earlier, expected shortfall is the more reasonable value to use for stress testing. The observed difference is sufficiently large to support this argument empirically and to show that VaR should not be used as a substitute for stress testing for typically long-tailed loss distributions.
Conclusion
We present an approach for stress testing retail credit portfolios using a dynamic model of default that includes macroeconomic conditions. We use PCA to generate MFs based on several macroeconomic time series that we believe could affect consumer delinquency. Since the MFs are uncorrelated 3 , simulated values can be generated for them independently and used as economic scenarios for stress testing, employing Monte Carlo simulation to build a distribution of estimated default rates.
This simulation approach has the advantage that it is potentially less subjective than scenario based approaches and, since it generates a loss distribution, it enables an empirical validation step through back-testing.
Our experimental results based on two large credit card portfolios show that dynamic models including macroeconomic conditions can be built successfully with one or two statistically significant MFs. MF2 is connected to consumption variables and is found to be the strongest macroeconomic driver of default. The inclusion of MFs is sufficient to produce a long tail on the simulated loss distributions. Without MFs, the tail is too short and, consequently, VaR and expected shortfall are too low to be plausible estimates of stressed loss rates. A binomial test is used to check the plausibility of loss distributions based on an out-of-sample validation data set. We also discovered that although the MFs are generally uncorrelated, over a local time period they may be highly correlated, leading to multicollinearity in the model.
Although this problem does not affect forecasts of expected (mean) default rates it does affect the use of the model for stress testing, generating much broader loss distributions and, consequentially, much larger VaR and expected shortfall. We successfully employed variable selection to avoid this problem.
The use of expected shortfall is contrasted with VaR as a measure of stressed loss.
We find a sufficiently large difference in the two values to effect risk management decisions and capital requirement calculations. Certainly, the use of expected shortfall is the more principled approach to calculating expected loss given worst case and this result reinforces the point that VaR may not be the most suitable measure for stress testing (BIS 2005) . We found that 99.9% expected shortfalls for the two credit card products A and B were 2.11 and 2.43 respectively, which are high but not implausible, in the light of evidence from the recent financial crisis.
Our research has raised several issues that require further investigation. Firstly, the model and simulation assumes that accounts are independent, conditional on economic circumstances. This may not be the case and we may need to assume or calculate an asset correlation. Sources are the UK Office of National Statistics (ONS), Nationwide Building Society (Nat) and the European Commission (EC). Data is monthly and may be seasonally adjusted (SA). Statistical significance is shown at 1% level (*) and 0.01% level (**). Note that all models also included application and behavioural variables but coefficient estimates for these are not shown. Estimated default rates are shown as a ratio to the median default rate given the Selected MF model. VaR and expected shortfall are given for the 99.9%ile. The scale on default rate is not shown for reasons of commercial confidentiality. The scale on default rate is not shown for reasons of commercial confidentiality. The scale on default rate is not shown for reasons of commercial confidentiality. The scale on default rate is not shown for reasons of commercial confidentiality.
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